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INTRODUCTION
Human society has long been fascinated with the concept of reading people's
minds. For centuries, charlatans have preyed on the gullible with claims of being able
to read minds through use of their psychic powers.' As technology progressed over
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the past century, science fiction writers imagined a world with devices that allow
humans to read each other's thoughts.2 The most famous of these works is George
Orwell's 1984, a dystopian tale in which "Thought Police" monitor the population,
seeking out dissidents for 'Thoughtcrime" against the government.3 Even non-fiction
writers weighed in-at least one Supreme Court Justice speculated about the pos-
sibility that technology might one day give the government the "means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. '
Sometime in the not-too-distant future, science may finally catch up to science
fiction. Recently, scientists around the world have reported breakthroughs in under-
standing the human brain and how it works.5 For example, scientists at the University
of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) performed an experiment in which the researchers
showed a clip of The Good, the Bad and the Ugly6 to participants while a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine scanned their brains.7 Based on the
2 For example, Strange Days, starring Ralph Fiennes and Angela Bassett, envisioned a
world where the black market for drugs is secondary to a black market for recordings of
people's memories. STRANGE DAYS (Lightstorm Entertainment 1995); see also JAMEs L.
HALPERIN, THE TRUTH MACHINE (1996); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (New American Library
1981) (1949); MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 2002).
3 ORWELL, supra note 2.
SOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). To say
that Justice Brandeis was concerned about such developments is an understatement. "'That
places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer' was said by James Otis of
much lesser intrusions than these [psychic means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts,
and emotions]." Id. Unfortunately, Justice Brandeis was dissenting in Olmstead, and, as this
Note will discuss, later Supreme Court doctrinal developments did not completely close the
door on potential government use of thought-reading technologies. See infra Part II.
5 See, e.g., Press Release, University of California at Los Angeles, First Evidence Found
Of Mirror Neuron's Role in Language (Sept. 20, 2006), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/
First-Evidence-Found-of-Mirror-7353.aspx?ncid=5368 (detailing recent study findings showing
that the same parts of the brain are activated when a person reads a sentence describing a
physical object and when that person looks at the same physical object); Tony Fitzpatrick,
Teenager Moves Video Icons Just by Imagination, Oct. 9, 2006, http://news-info.wustl.edu/
news/page/normal/7800.html (detailing an experiment in which neurosurgeons, neurologists,
and engineers created an interface that read an epileptic child's brain activity, allowing him to
control a video game using only his thoughts); Mark Peplow, Brain Imaging Could Spot Liars,
BIOED ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2004, http://www.bioedonline.org/news/news.cfm?art= 1409 (detailing
the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging by researchers to detect areas of the brain
activated by lying); "Thoughts Read" Via Brain Scans, BBC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2005, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/health/4715327.stm [hereinafter Thoughts Read] (detailing two studies
in which researchers were able to link images a person was viewing to specific electrical
patterns in the brain).
6 THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY (United Artists 1967).
7 Thoughts Read, supra note 5. FMRI technology is a derivative of magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) technology. Comm. on Science & Law, Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New
York, Are Your Thoughts Your Own ?: "Neuroprivacy" and the Legal Implications of Brain
[Vol. 16:865
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scans, the researchers could "tell one part of a scene from another" and distinguish
between various sounds a participant was hearing at a given time.8 The studies dem-
onstrated that fMRI machines could, in theory, be used to read thoughts, though the
researchers cautioned that they are a long way from being able to read people's
minds.9 Nonetheless, the "study represents an important but very early stage step
towards eventually building a machine that can track a person's consciousness on
a second-by-second basis."'" "One day, someone will come up with a machine in
a baseball cap," said Dr. John-Dylan Haynes." "Then it really could be helpful in
everyday applications. 12
That day may come sooner than anyone imagined. Indeed, the pace of innovation
in this area is at once impressive and alarming. 3 Less than two years after researchers
published the UCLA studies, several other researchers released studies with significant
Imaging, 60 RECORD 407,410-11 (2005) [hereinafterAre Your Thoughts Your Own?]. Both
technologies use magnetic fields and radio waves to produce pictures of the brain. Id. at 410.
The difference is that traditional MRI technology creates a static image of the brain, while
fMRI can be used to take pictures in rapid succession, essentially allowing scientists to create
movies of the brain as it performs different tasks. Id. There are a number of other potential
technologies that could ultimately serve to read people's thoughts. See id. at 410-11; see also
Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for
Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509,515-37 (2006) (discussing various technol-
ogies in this field). Electroencephalography (EEG), for example, is used as part of a technique
called "brain fingerprinting." Are Your Thoughts Your Own?, supra, at 411,414-16; Keckler,
supra, at 519-25; Andre A. Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting-Can It Be Used to Detect the
Innocence of Persons Charged with a Crime?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 891, 896 (2002). "Brain
fingerprinting" measures brainwaves to determine whether individuals have certain infor-
mation stored in their brains. Moenssens, supra, at 893-99. Proponents of brain fingerprinting
qualify the technique's utility, asserting that while it cannot "establish guilt or innocence,"
it can determine whether a subject has certain relevant knowledge stored in her brain. Id. at
902. This technology has already been offered in some cases. Are Your Thoughts Your Own ?,
supra, at 414 (discussing a convicted murderer who submitted brain fingerprinting as evidence
during his appeal).
8 Thoughts Read, supra note 5 (quoting Professor Itzhak Fried).
9 Id.
Id. (quoting Dr. John-Dylan Haynes).
"Id.
12 id.
'3 See, e.g., Tom Heneghan, Call for "Neuroethics" as Brain Science Races Ahead,
REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSL14405321200
70215?src=021507_0839_ARTICLEPROMOalso on reuters; see also Ronald Bailey, A
Truth Machine, REASON ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2001, http://www.reason.com/news/show/34911
.html (discussing the speed of innovations in thought-reading technology); Emily Singer,
Building the Cortex in Silicon, TECH. REV., Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.technologyreview
.com/readarticle.aspx?id=18164&ch=infotech (discussing attempts to build a functional
computer model of the brain that would allow scientists to study thought patterns in an
experimental setting).
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ramifications for the development of thought-reading technology. 4 The most impor-
tant of these innovations came from an international group of scientists who claimed
to be able to read minds using fMRI.' 5 The researchers said they could read people's
intentions with a seventy percent accuracy rate using a program developed to read
fMRI scans looking for patterns of activity. 6 This research might lead to technology
capable of reading abstract thoughts.17 Further, such research may make it possible
to send email or perform other routine tasks simply by thinking. 8 "[W]hat you can
be absolutely sure of is that these [studies] will continue to roll out," said Professor
Colin Blakemore.' 9 "[W]e will have more and more ability to probe people's inten-
tions, minds, background thoughts, hopes and emotions."2°
Other scientists are pressing ahead in the search for everyday applications of
thought-reading technology. For example, some researchers are attempting to ascer-
tain people's unconscious racial attitudes using existing technologies.2' Others are
engaging in "neuromarketing," which uses MRI technology to detect consumers' un-
conscious preferences for different products.22 Although the underlying theory of
neuromarketing is now controversial, 23 it may become less so over time as thought-
reading technology improves.
As the development of thought-reading technologies races along, society must
face the serious ramifications this revolutionary science presents, and it should do
" See, e.g., "Altruistic" Brain Region Found, BBC NEWS, Jan. 22,2007, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/health/6278907.stm (discussing a recent study that claims to have discovered the
area of the brain responsible for altruistic behavior in humans); Brain Scan "Can Read Your
Mind, "BBC NEWS, Feb. 9,2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/6346069.stm [hereinafter
Scan "Can Read"]; Candace Lombardi, The Next Game Controller-Your Brain?, CNET
NEWS, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.news.com/the-next-game-controller-your-brain/2100-1043
_3-6165143.html?tag=item (discussing the planned use of a helmet as a "brain/computer
interface" to be released to the market by 2008); Science Tracks How the Brain's "Clock"
Ticks, FORBES, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/health/feeds/hscout/2007/02/02/hscout
601436.html (discussing development of a new model of how the human brain tracks the
passage of time); Tom Simonite, Neural "Extension Cord" Developed for Brain Implants,
NEwSCIENTIST, Jan. 19,2007, http://www.newscientist.con/channel/tech/dn 10997 (discussing
development of a "data cable" of nerves that could one day be used to connect computers to
the human nervous system).
" Scan "Can Read," supra note 14.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
2" Are Your Thoughts Your Own?, supra note 7, at 412-13.
22 Id. at 413.
23 Id. at 413-14; see also Heneghan, supra note 13 (discussing the possibility of practical
applications of neuromarketing in five to ten years and the likelihood that such applications
would be unethical).
(Vol. 16:865
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so sooner, rather than later. "The potential for misuse of this technology is pro-
found," said Judy files, director of the Stanford University neuroethics program in
California.24 "This is a truly urgent situation. 25 Already scientists can read simple
intentions and get "yes" or "no" responses-"simple things that are quite useful for
applications. 26 As another scientist explained, "[p]eople want to know if, when they
go to an airport, their luggage will go through one scanner and their brains will go
through another. Do I think that's around the corner? I do.' 27 Scientists already real-
ize that the potential for misuse of thought-reading technology mirrors the situations
presented by science fiction.28 It also creates frightening opportunities for real-life
dictators. As one fMRI proponent put it, "If I were the next Joe Stalin, I could use this
technology to figure out who my friends and enemies are very simply, so I'd know
who to shoot." 29 As such, scientists are pushing for discussions of "how we want to
use this technology and who should have access to it" now.30
Assuming that this technology will continue to develop rapidly, it will clearly
pose challenges for our legal system as well as basic ethics. The possibility of actual
thought-reading devices presents fascinating challenges for our constitutional system.
Such technology has endless applications in a law enforcement setting. Thought-
reading devices could help solve cold cases and help police eliminate potential suspects
quickly and reliably. And, of course, such devices would greatly facilitate efforts to
root out terrorists before they can harm civilians. Beyond the law enforcement arena,
thought-reading technology could affect civil suits as well. What tort plaintiff would
not want to be able to introduce evidence of precisely what the tortfeasor was thinking
when she committed the alleged tort? Regardless of the setting, every potential use
of thought-reading devices in the legal context raises grave constitutional concerns.
This Note focuses on the constitutional implications of the potential use of thought-
reading devices in the law enforcement setting.31 Part I begins with a brief review
of the most analogous technology that courts have dealt with to date: polygraph ma-
chines. Part II then reviews the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment
searches and Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Part I tests
the boundaries of these doctrines by applying them to thought-reading technologies.
24 Heneghan, supra note 13 (quoting Dr. John-Dylan Haynes).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. (quoting Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for
Cognitive Neuroscience).
28 See id. (noting the potential for misuse as presented in Minority Report).
29 Jeff Wise, This is Your Brain. . ., POPULAR MECHANICS, Nov. 2007, at 68.
30 Heneghan, supra note 13 (quoting Martha Farah).
31 This Note focuses on a criminal setting, but there are a number of other potential settings
in which the constitutionality of such technology could be challenged. For example, corpo-
rations could use this technology to investigate violations of company policy and terminate
employees based on the results. Any federal or state law that would allow such a use of this
technology could be challenged as allowing unconstitutional violations of privacy.
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Finally, in Part IV, this Note looks at principles underlying the Bill of Rights to propose
a new standard for Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues involving thought-reading
technologies, thereby addressing the limitations of current doctrines.
I. POLYGRAPHS: AN ANALOG WITH HISTORY
To date, the technology most similar to thought-reading devices that the courts
have dealt with extensively is the polygraph machine.32 Polygraph technology has
experienced a rocky relationship with the U.S. court system.33 Beginning with a crude
predecessor to the polygraph machine in Frye v. United States, courts experienced
difficulty in determining how exactly to deal with questions about polygraphs.34 In
Frye, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected the admissibility of evidence from systolic
blood pressure deception tests on the basis that the tests had not gained "general
acceptance" in the scientific field.35 Although the court in Frye acknowledged the
difficulty in discerning what constitutes general acceptance, the court nonetheless
adopted the following standard:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.36
32 Catherine M. Polizzi, A New View into the Truth: Impact of a Reliable Deception
Detection Technology on the Legal System, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 395, 398
& n.9 (1995).
13 See id. at 404-05 ("In terms of admissibility, deception detection technology has not
fared well. The reliability of the polygraph has been hotly debated, and reports of polygraph
accuracy vary widely. Indeed, its theoretical underpinnings (i.e., that lying is accompanied by
detectable physical manifestations) have been summarily dismissed by some commentators."
(footnotes omitted)); Timothy B. Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility
of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH.
U. L. REv. 1247, 1247 (1997) ("The polygraph and other deception detection instruments
have suffered through a tumultuous seventy years in the American legal system."). Notably,
polygraph hypotheticals have troubled commentators as well. See Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin
Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 243,249-50 (2004) (noting that analysis of a hypothetical involving someone
subjected to a lie detector who never says anything but is convicted based on his physiological
responses to specific questions "has bedeviled analysis of the Fifth Amendment").
14 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
" Id. at 1014.
36 Id.
[Vol. 16:865870
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Using Frye, courts routinely excluded polygraph evidence, with many imposing per
se bans on the introduction of such test results.37
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence displaced Frye's general acceptance test.38 After Daubert,
the questions used to determine polygraph admissibility became the same as those for
any other type of scientific evidence: "whether the expert is proposing to testify to
(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine
a fact in issue. '39 The Court went on to note that the initial determination of admissi-
bility for any scientific evidence depends on its scientific validity and, therefore, its
reliability.4° The Daubert decision spawned speculation that polygraph evidence would
become admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and indeed some courts re-
vised their per se rules against polygraph admissibility in response to the decision.
However, in United States v. Scheffer, the Court allowed a per se ban on polygraph
evidence in the Military Rules of Evidence to remain in place.42 Focusing, in part, on
controversy regarding the reliability of polygraphs, the Court concluded that a per
se ban did not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.4 3
Scheffer represents a continuation of the longer trend against the admissibility of
polygraph evidence."
Polygraphs, however, have not presented courts with the same kind of constitu-
tional questions as newer technologies. By focusing on the reliability of polygraphs,
31 See Polizzi, supra note 32, at 405; Henseler, supra note 33, at 1259-61. New Mexico
is the only state to fully allow the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Henseler, supra note
33, at 1262-66.
3' 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. Though these questions guide admissibility of polygraph
evidence, it should be noted that defendants may have a right to offer polygraph results in
support of their case. See generally Robin D. Barovick, Comment, Between Rock anda Hard
Place: Polygraph Prejudice Persists After Scheffer, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 1533, 1542-45 (1999)
(noting that polygraph prejudice circumscribes a defendant's constitutional right to present
a defense); Doran D. Peters, Comment, Per Se Prohibitions of the Admission of Polygraph
Evidence as Upheld in SchefferAre Both Violative of the Constitution and the Federal Rules
of Evidence as Applied by Daubert, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249,275-78 (2000) (arguing that per
se rules against polygraph evidence affect the constitutional rights of defendants). Polygraphs,
like thought-reading technology, implicate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments for similar
reasons discussed in Parts III and IV. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
763-64 (1966) (noting that lie detector technology may seemingly be geared to physical
evidence but really violates Fifth Amendment protections).
40 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 ("In short, the requirement [in the Federal Rules of Evidence]
that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.").
41 See Henseler, supra note 33, at 1249-50.
42 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).
41 See id.
4 Barovick, supra note 39, at 1542-43.
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the Court has ducked more fundamental questions regarding technologies that purport
to measure one's truthfulness by measuring physiological changes. 5 By considering
the impending development of thought-reading machines, these constitutional ques-
tions come into sharper relief.' The rest of this Note focuses on the constitutional
problems inherent in the use of thought-reading technology, but ultimately these
problems exist in varying degrees for all forms of truth-detection technology that
monitor physiology.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THOUGHT-READING DEVICES
The use of thought-reading devices by the government potentially violates a
number of constitutional rights. First Amendment protections regarding freedom of
" At least one commentator has argued that the focus on the reliability of polygraphs is
misdirected, instead calling for a relative measure of the reliability of polygraphs against other
forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, which is notoriously unreliable. See Jeffrey
Philip Ouellet, Note, Posado and the Polygraph: The Truth Behind Post-Daubert Deception
Detection, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 769, 802 (1997) ("Focusing on the strengths and weak-
nesses of polygraph evidence in the abstract is misleading .... Therefore, the appropriate
inquiry is not whether polygraph evidence is reliable given its error rate, but rather whether
the evidence is reliable when compared with other types of evidence that courts routinely
admit."). More importantly, the focus on reliability in polygraph decisions avoids the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment questions discussed below that are more fundamental. These questions
have only been discussed, rather unsatisfyingly, by the Court in dicta. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
46 Some commentators have considered these issues in the context of enhanced variations
on lie detectors. See, e.g., George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New
Thermal Imaging Lie Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2004) (discussing the
potential use of thermal imaging lie detector technology); Keckler, supra note 7, at 537-53
(discussing the potential development and use of a deception detection device in a courtroom
setting and proposing a model for using such a device in such a way that would satisfy the
Federal Rules of Evidence); Polizzi, supra note 32 (discussing the courtroom uses of reliable
deception detection technology); see also Moenssens, supra note 7 (discussing how brain
fingerprinting could fit into current legal paradigms for admitting evidence); Michael S. Pardo,
Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1857, 1863 (2005) (discussing the possibility that the government could strap a thought-reading
lie detector to a suspect without violating the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause
using a reliability analysis because the defendant would not face any choice with regard to
revealing any information). With some exceptions, however, commentators have focused on
Daubert reliability issues rather than looking at the more fundamental constitutional problems
that such technologies may create. Cf. Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use
ofPsychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELLL. REV. 1601 (2005)
(discussing the use of fMRI technology in the interrogation of foreign detainees to detect
deception and potentially other cognitive information).
[Vol. 16:865
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speech47 are clearly implicated; freedom of thought is, after all, a necessary prerequisite
to the exercise of free speech.48 The constitutional right to privacy,"9 even in its
most narrow conception, is at stake when it is possible to monitor people's innermost
thoughts. Focusing on the criminal law arena narrows the field of inquiry signifi-
cantly. The remainder of this Note will focus on questions regarding the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and the Fifth Amendment's
protections against self-incrimination'"
A. Fourth Amendment Searches
When considering whether the Fourth Amendment5' would apply to thought-
reading devices, the first question to consider is whether the use of such technology
constitutes a "search."5 2 The second question is whether that search is "reasonable." 53
Surprisingly, this second prong is, in some ways, the easier of the two prongs to under-
stand under current doctrine. The default position under the Fourth Amendment is
that a search is reasonable if executed "pursuant to a warrant supported by probable
cause."54 This default position is, of course, subject to several exceptions.55 Thus,
41 U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press...").
48 See infra Part IV.C. for a discussion of the links between freedom of speech and
freedom of thought.
"9 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a right to privacy
under the Constitution).
50 For an enlightening discussion of the problems in modem Fourth and Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence and scholarship, see Pardo, supra note 46, at 1859-60 (discussing the theoretical
overlap of the two amendments and the problems that have resulted from the Court's modem
interpretation of the amendments as totally separate spheres).
5' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
52 See Pardo, supra note 46, at 1867.
" Id. at 1867-68.
14 Id. at 1868.
" Id. (noting the following exceptions to the default rule that searches are reasonable if
conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause: "warrants are unnecessary
when there are exigent circumstances, automobiles involved, suspects arrested outside their
home, or searches conducted incident to arrests," when there is reasonable suspicion "that
a crime has occurred or is about to occur," and when there are governmental "special needs"
involved (footnotes omitted)).
20081
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although there may be question as to whether probable cause exists in a given situ-
ation, the question of whether a search is reasonable is relatively straightforward.
5 6
Determining whether or not a search occurs, however, is not as straightforward
under the Court's search jurisprudence.5 7 Some evidence indicates that the Framers
enacted the Fourth Amendment believing it only covered searches of homes-not
commercial establishments or people in public.5 8 Consequently, up until the 1960s,
the Court's jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment searches focused "solely on property
interests" to determine whether a search occurred.59 That standard changed when
the Court decided Katz v. United States in 1967. 60
56 That said, there are two important caveats to note. First, because the Fourth Amendment
only protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. CONST. amend. IV, deter-
mining whether reading someone's thoughts is ever "reasonable" is important. For reasons
discussed infra in Parts II.B.2 and II.B.4, it is entirely plausible that society's shifting con-
ception of reasonableness could encompass thought-reading technology. In that case, police
could execute searches of people's thoughts pursuant to warrants. Further, it is important to
note that, at the very least, the exception allowing for warrantless searches when there is reason-
able suspicion that a crime has occurred or is about to occur clearly implicates the possible
use of thought-reading technology. If police suspected someone of being involved in a crime
(past or future), they could conceivably conduct a thought-scan without a warrant if such
suspicions are "reasonable." Again, if the use of thought-reading technology is reasonable, such
warrantless searches could be permissible. As such, the Fourth Amendment may provide
only limited protections if thought-reading technology comes to be viewed as a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes.
" Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("On the other hand, the antecedent
question whether or not a Fourth Amendment 'search' has occurred is not so simple under
our precedent.").
58 See David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2004). Steinberg's takeaway from the Court's convo-
luted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that the Court should return to an originalist, strictly-
limited understanding of the Amendment as preventing only unlawful physical searches of
homes with only a general warrant or no warrant. Id. at 1096. In light of the increasing chal-
lenges to basic freedoms from technological advances, rolling back the protections offered by
modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seems ill-advised.
" Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HAsTINGS L.J. 1303, 1303 (2002). See also, Steinberg,
supra note 58, at 1053 (discussing the Court's treatment of the Fourth Amendment and its
discongruence with the Framers' intent for the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
60 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding the government's electronic surveillance of petitioner un-
constitutional); see also Andrew Riggs Dunlap, Note, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade
Secret Law: A Response to Kyllo v. United States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2176 (2002) (noting
that Katz represented a change from location-based protections); David A. Sullivan, Note,
A Bright Line in the Sky? Toward a New Fourth Amendment Search StandardforAdvancing
Surveillance Technology, 44 ARiz. L. REV. 967 (2002) (analyzing the Katz test). Katz repre-
sents an especially appropriate starting point for considering the potential implications of
thought-reading devices because it too involved the use of sensory-enhancing technology by
law enforcement.
[Vol. 16:865
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1. Katz-The Fourth Amendment Protects People
Katz involved the use of an electronic listening and recording device that agents
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attached to a public phone booth.61
Without a warrant, the agents used the device to overhear and record Katz's conver-
sations, during which he made bets "by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and
Boston, in violation of a federal statute." 62 The trial court allowed the prosecution
to offer evidence of these conversations at trial, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.63 In
affirming Katz's conviction, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the FBI agents did
not physically enter the telephone booth where the petitioner made his calls.64 Be-
fore the Supreme Court, the parties focused on traditional spatial Fourth Amendment
analysis, arguing whether a phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area. 65
The Katz Court, however, found this formulation of the issues "misleading"' and de-
cided to use a different analysis.67 According to the Court, "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places. 68
With this new formulation, the Katz Court changed and expanded the focus of
the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches beyond the home.69
The true scope of the Fourth Amendment no longer "turn[ed] upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."70 The Court concluded that
the FBI agents conducted a search of Katz for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 7'
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz produced the test for determining whether a
search occurs.7 2 According to Justice Harlan, "there is a twofold requirement" for
61 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
62 Id.
63 id.
64 Id. at 348-49.
65 Id. at 349-52.
6 Id. at 351 ("Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties
have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls.").
67 Id. at 350-51 (declining to adopt the parties' characterization of the issues in the case,
which revolved around whether a phone booth was a constitutionally protected place).
68 Id. at 351. But see infra section II.B.1 (discussing why Katz did not fully abandon the
importance of location in Fourth Amendment analysis).
69 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
70 Id. at 353.
"' Id. ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
72 Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice
Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1021 (2001); Steinberg, supra note
58, at 1054.
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a government action to constitute a search: "first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 73 This two-part test now forms
the cornerstone of the Court's Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence.74
As the Court developed its Fourth Amendment search doctrine, it became clear
that the first prong of the test is virtually meaningless.7 5 As a result, the true test, fol-
lowing Katz, is whether society considers a given expectation of privacy reasonable.76
Of course, what society considers reasonable changes over time.77 As the Court
noted, technology can drive these changes and has the potential to shrink the sphere
of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.78
2. Kyllo, Thermal Imaging, and Shrinking Spheres of Protection
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court considered thermal imaging
technology 79-a potentially analogous technology to some of the technologies under
development for thought-reading. The Court reviewed the warrantless use of thermal
imaging devices to detect relative levels of heat in a home.80 Agents from the U.S.
Department of the Interior used a thermal imager to scan for heat levels in the de-
fendant' s house to determine whether the defendant was using high-intensity lamps
typically associated with growing marijuana. 8' The agents used the results of the
71 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Because of the way Harlan formulated his
view of the Fourth Amendment, he limited his holding in Katz:
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an
enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a
field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place
that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected
area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively
unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.
Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted).
7" Steinberg, supra note 58, at 1054; cf Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001)
(noting that the Supreme Court applied Justice Harlan's Katz test "somewhat in reverse").
7" See Ric Simmons, Technology-Enhanced Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officials,
60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 711, 714 n.6 (2005) [hereinafter Simmons, Technology-
Enhanced Surveillance].
76 Simmons, supra note 59, at 1313.
77 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
78 Id.; cf Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,472-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that technological advances can challenge constitutional protections of individual
rights unless the Court adapts its jurisprudence to those advances).
71 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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thermal imaging in conjunction with tips from informants and utility bills to obtain
a warrant. When the agents exercised the warrant, they discovered a large indoor
marijuana growing operation; this evidence helped procure a successful prosecution
of the defendant.8 3
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Kyllo' s conviction, holding the warrant used to search
the defendant's home valid because the homeowner had not shown a "subjective ex-
pectation of privacy" by trying to prevent the heat from escaping his home.s8 The
Court also ruled that there was "no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy"
because the thermal imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life. 85
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
and holding.86 While taking a not-so-subtle dig at Katz,8 7 the Court nonetheless held
that there was an existing standard by which to determine whether there was a reason-
able expectation of privacy in this case-namely the common law protection of the
interior of homes.88 In other words, at least to some degree, Kyllo represents a return
to the location-based jurisprudence of the pre-Katz era.89
The Court's partial return to location-based Fourth Amendment search protections
in Kyllo muddled the Court's jurisprudence. However, the Court went one step fur-
ther in confusing Fourth Amendment search analysis with potentially important
implications for thinking about thought-reading technology. In holding that the use
of the thermal imager on Kyllo's home was a search, Justice Scalia's opinion quali-
fied the holding by leaving open the possibility that the result of the case could change
with public use of the technology in question.9° "We think that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally
82 Id. at 30.
83 id.
'4 Id. at 31.
85 Id. (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion, 190 F.3d 1041, 1047 (1999)).
86 Id. at 34-35, 38.
87 Id. at 34 (discussing criticism of the Katz test as "circular, and hence subjective and
unpredictable" in some contexts (citations omitted)).
88 Id.
89 See id. at 31 (emphasizing the importance of protecting the home under the Fourth
Amendment: "'At the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); see also Dunlap, supra note 60, at
2176, 2187 (calling Kyllo a "Pyrrhic victory" for privacy protection because of the Court's
return to location-based Fourth Amendment protections). But see Seamon, supra note 72, at
1015 (arguing that Kyllo was only a partial victory for Justice Scalia and that it was not a
repudiation of Katz); Simmons, supra note 59, at 1314 (noting the Court's continued reliance
on location in post-Katz cases to show that Katz did not entirely supplant the "place-based"
Fourth Amendment analysis that preceded it).
90 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
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protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use."'" To some degree, Justice Scalia's "general
public use" qualification represented a melding of the Katz reasonableness test into
his own location-based jurisprudence.92 Thus, even while Justice Scalia purported
to answer the question of "what limits there are upon this power of technology to
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy,"93 his opinion opened the door for continued
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.'
The Court was clearly concerned, in both Katz and Kyllo, with the ability of tech-
nology to reduce the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment. 95 However, the
holdings of those cases ultimately leave the door open for technology to overrun the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Limitations of Katz and Kyllo
Although Katz and Kyllo represent an evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine
to reflect changing technology, they are nonetheless halting steps with significant
limitations. First, these decisions and their progeny retained a focus on the location
of the government activity in question.96 Second, Kyllo conditioned the term "search"
on whether a given technology is in "general public use. 97 Third, Katz required
"' Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
92 Seamon, supra note 72, at 1025 (noting that Kyllo represents a "leavening" of Scalia's
location-based approach with the Katz test).
9' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
94 See Adam W. Brill, Case Note, Kyllo v. United States: Is the Court's Bright-Line Rule
on Thennal Imaging Written in Disappearing Ink?, 56 ARK. L. REV. 431,454 (2003) (arguing
that Kyllo's bright-line rule is undermined by the Court's use of "open terms" and that the
decision might not provide protections in the future); Sarilyn E. Hardee, Note, Why the
United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United States Is Not the Final Word on the
Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 53, 68-70 (2001) (arguing that
Kyllo's bright-line rule is "more fuzzy than bright" and that there are "gaping holes" in the
decision which could ultimately reduce protections under the Fourth Amendment); Reginald
Short, Comment, The Kyllo Conundrum: A New Standard to Address Technology that Repre-
sents a Step Backward for Fourth Amendment Protections, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 463, 481
(2002) (arguing that Kyllo represents "a step backward for privacy protection" because it is
"ill-equipped to handle the challenges of an increasingly mobile and transitory society").
" See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting the potential of technology to shrink the Fourth
Amendment protections and proposing to limit the degree that the Court would allow that to
happen); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (noting the importance of the
telephone in modem life and the need to interpret the Constitution in a way to afford pro-
tections to the new technology).
96 See Simmons, supra note 59, at 1314 (noting that the Court emphasized the role of real
and personal property concepts in its opinions post Katz, and that Katz did not entirely supplant
the preceding "place-based" Fourth Amendment analysis).
9' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also Quin M. Sorenson, Comment, Losing a Plain View of
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there be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information being sought.98 Tied
up in both the general public use problem and the reasonable expectation problem
is whether either Katz or Kyllo offers any Fourth Amendment protection when in-
vasive technologies become pervasive.99 Finally, because the Fourth Amendment
only precludes "unreasonable searches,"' ° Katz, Kyllo, and the Fourth Amendment
generally provide only limited protections from potential use and abuse of thought-
reading technology.
1. Location
As the Court demonstrated in Kyllo, it has not completely abandoned its focus on
location in its Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence."'0 The Court's focus on the historical
importance of the home in Fourth Amendment cases shows this clearly." 2 "We have
said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the house.' That
line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright-which requires clear specifica-
tion of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant."'1 3 Tellingly, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, buttressed his argument that the thermal imaging at
issue violated the Fourth Amendment by referring back to pre-Katz precedent dealing
with "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."' 4 Thus, Kyllo is, at least to
some degree, a return to the greater focus on location and property that dominated
before Katz.'l5
However, Katz itself did not entirely abandon the use of location in determining
Fourth Amendment protections.' °6 Implicit in Katz's reasonable expectation test is,
Katz: The Loss of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the Readily Available Standard,
107 DICK. L. REV. 179, 191 (2002).
98 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Simmons, Technology-Enhanced
Surveillance, supra note 75, at 714.
9' For a discussion of the relationship between pervasive technology and the law, see Susan
W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15 WIDENER L.J. 667 (2006) (discussing
the development and adoption of pervasive technology and its implications for the development
of law).
'0o U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'o' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
'03 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (citation omitted).
"o Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
'o' See Seamon, supra note 72, at 1021-26 (discussing the relationship between Katz and
Kyllo and the Kyllo majority's use of an "amalgam" of the Katz test and Justice Scalia's more
traditional, location-focused approach); see also Short, supra note 94, at 481 (asserting that
the Kyllo Court "revert[ed] back to a property-based analysis of Fourth Amendment rights");
Sullivan, supra note 60, at 984 (characterizing the Kyllo Court's approach as a "retreat from
a pure Katz analysis" in which "the Court seems to rely on physical location").
16 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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to some degree, a reliance on the location where a search occurs. °7 Location. is
arguably one of the key factors in determining whether society believes a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in what she is doing.'08 Whether a person is walk-
ing down a crowded city street, is in her car, a friend's apartment, or her own house
changes the way we conceive of what amount of privacy she could expect. As a re-
sult, while Katz clearly changed the Fourth Amendment protection calculus,"° it did
not entirely eliminate consideration of location," 0 despite its famous proclamation
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."''.
2. General Public Use
As noted above, Justice Scalia included a particularly puzzling line in Kyllo,
asserting that when the government conducts surveillance facilitated by technology
"not in generalpublic use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search.'"l 2 This
line is puzzling, in part, because it follows Justice Scalia's assertion that the majority
drew a "firm" and "bright" line for surveillance that requires a warrant by "tak[ing]
the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.""..3 But,
by conditioning the majority's holding on whether a given technology is not "in gen-
eral use," Justice Scalia created a line that is neither firm nor bright nor particularly
durable. 14 For example, presumably if thermal imaging technology became a staple
in corporate America or a popular form of amusement for bored suburbanites, Kyllo
would come out differently.'1 5
107 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the
determination of how much protection the Fourth Amendment provides to people "requires
reference to a 'place').
0 See Simmons, supra note 59, at 1314.
'o See Dunlap, supra note 60, at 2176.
110 Simmons, supra note 59, at 1314.
1' Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the continuing
importance of location in analyzing Fourth Amendment claims).
112 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (emphasis added).
113 Id.
"' See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the protection of the majority's "firm
but also bright" line "apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is 'in general
public use"'); see also Short, supra note 94, at 481-82 (noting that many commentators
criticized the Kyllo decision as "likely allow[ing] use of invasive technology in areas less tied
to the traditional Fourth Amendment centers of personal privacy"); Sorenson, supra note 97,
at 195 ("Under Kyllo, once a sense-enhancement technology is held by a court to be readily
available, use of that technology to view the interior of a home can never be considered a
search." (footnotes omitted)). But cf. Seamon, supra note 72, at 1023 (arguing that general
public use only "'may be a factor"' and that this prong was mentioned by the majority under
a compulsion to reference precedent) (footnote omitted).
"' Cf supra text accompanying note 113.
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Ignoring the problems inherent in determining when a technology is officially
"in general public use,""' 6 the main problem with this qualification is that in modem
society, technology quickly becomes pervasive."' The driving forces of capitalism
spur innovation and can turn technologies once thought impracticable for everyday
use into staples of modem convenience. 118 Modem society's rapid technological prog-
ress and adoption potentially render this caveat all but moot." 9 Indeed, Justice Scalia
recognized this phenomenon to some degree in Kyllo when he acknowledged the
"power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."' 20
3. Expectation of Privacy
A closely related problem to the general public use caveat in Kyllo is the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" concept from Katz itself. 2 ' To at least some
degree, Justice Scalia's general public use caveat probably developed from the Katz
standard. 122 The two concepts are clearly related. As noted earlier, society's definition
of what is reasonable evolves over time.1 23 Technology plays a role in the evolution
of what is reasonable. As technologies that inherently erode privacy are developed
and become pervasive (i.e., in general public use), expectations of privacy are likely
to shrink in response. In the Kyllo-context, for example, "[wihen sense-enhancement
technology becomes readily available to the public, citizens can have no reasonable
expectation that information exposed by the use of such technology will not be
116 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion
does not even attempt to define what constitutes "general public use" and that the technology
in that case could be obtained with relative ease by anyone in the general public).
17 Brenner, supra note 99, at 671 (discussing the accelerating trend toward the development
of pervasive technologies).
118 For example, during the fall of 2001, Apple introduced the world to the iPod at a time
when MP3 players had yet to take off. Rob Walker, The Guts of a New Machine, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Nov. 30, 2003, at A79. In two years, Apple sold 1.4 million iPods, developed three ver-
sions, and became an icon. Id. Consumer technology generally has accelerated the pace of de-
velopment and adoption of technology in modem society. See Brenner, supra note 99, at 671.
n9 Arguably, the use of voice-based lie detector tests, which measure the level of stress
in a subject's voice, would already satisfy Justice Scalia's general public use test. On MTV
Exposed, unwitting singles are subjected to voice-based lie detector software while answering
questions from a potential date. MTV, MTV Exposed, http://www.mtv.com/ontv/dyn/mtv
_exposed/summary.jhtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). The questioner then decides who she will
choose for a date based on the results of the test. Id. Such software is readily available via
Internet download. See, e.g., X13-VSA, Voice Stress Analysis Lie Detector Software, http://
www.lie-detection.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (selling voice stress analysis software).
120 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
122 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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perceived by either other citizens or the government."'24 Without this reasonable
expectation, the Fourth Amendment would provide no relief to people whom law
enforcement officers search using this technology without a warrant because no Fourth
Amendment search would have taken place.
Both Katz and Kyllo, thus, leave a gaping hole in the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment in the face of rapidly advancing technologies. They stand, at least
in part, for the proposition that the invasiveness of technology need not be considered
as long as the information sought is not reasonably expected to be private.'
2 5
4. More Reasonableness and the Limits of Fourth Amendment Protections
Beyond the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis inherent in Katz and
Kyllo, the Fourth Amendment also begs a general reasonableness inquiry. The Fourth
Amendment limits only "unreasonable searches and seizures."' 26 Thus, if searching
people's thoughts is reasonable, law enforcement would only need to comply with
other Fourth Amendment strictures, such as obtaining a warrant pursuant to probable
cause, to conduct thought searches. 127 Although the default position under the Fourth
Amendment is that searches are reasonable if supported by a warrant and probable
cause, other factors can bear on reasonableness as well. 128 A court could, for example,
consider the general position that society takes with respect to a given form of search
in determining whether that search was reasonable. 129
Of course, as already noted, what is reasonable changes over time, often in response
to new technology. When technology shrinks the realm of what constitutes a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, that technology necessarily affects how people view
the reasonableness of using that technology as a search tool. If technology changes
people's reasonable expectations of privacy, the reasonableness analysis under the rest
of the Fourth Amendment changes as well. In the end, because the Fourth Amendment
only protects against unreasonable searches, shifting conceptions of what constitutes
124 Sorenson, supra note 97, at 191 (footnote omitted).
125 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (noting that society must consider an expectation of privacy
reasonable in order for a search to exist under the Fourth Amendment); see also Simmons
Technology-Enhanced Surveillance, supra note 75, at 717, 732 (noting that under Katz and
Kyllo it is the nature of the information sought and whether there is a reasonable privacy expec-
tation that determines the constitutionality of a search, not its degree of invasiveness).
126 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
127 Pardo, supra note 46, at 1868 (discussing the "default rule" that searches are reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment "if conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable
cause." But see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv.
757 (1994) (arguing that no such strictures exist and that reasonableness alone is the core value
of the Fourth Amendment).
'28 See Pardo, supra note 46, at 1868 (discussing exceptions to the default probable cause
based warrant requirement that are all inherently variations of reasonableness calculations).
129 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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reasonable searches could mean that the Fourth Amendment provides little, if any,
protection against government use and abuse of thought-reading technology. As a
result, other protections are likely needed.
C. Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Such protections might be found in the Fifth Amendment. 0 The Fifth Amend-
ment' s prohibition on compelled self-incrimination and the Supreme Court's subse-
quent treatment of that prohibition figure prominently in the potential application
of thought-reading technology to law enforcement settings.131 Unfortunately, the
Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence is at least as tricky as its Fourth Amend-
ment search jurisprudence and is equally ill-equipped to deal with thought-reading
technology. Indeed, some commentators have called it "an unsolved riddle of vast
proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights." ' Others have
characterized the Court's attempts to explain the Fifth Amendment as heavy on
"stirring rhetoric" and light on satisfying reason and justification. 133 The Court itself
has recognized that the Fifth Amendment represents "fundamental values," but at
the same time no one has figured out precisely "just what it is supposed to do or just
whom it is intended to protect."'
3 4
The Fifth Amendment details three criteria that serve to trigger protections against
self-incrimination. 1 35 There must be (1) a criminal case involved (2) without govern-
ment compulsion of the defendant (3) "to be a witness against himself.' 136 The first
element is easily determined: if a case is not a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination does not apply.' The second and third elements
present the real complexity of applying Fifth Amendment protections to thought-
reading technology.
130 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
131 See Bailey, supra note 13 (asking whether brain fingerprinting raises self-incrimination
concerns and finding an analogy between brain fingerprinting and forensic evidence, such
as fingerprints or DNA, conceptually troublesome).
132 Akhil Reed Amar & Rende B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 857 (1995).
133 Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 244.
134 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964) (quoting
Harry Kalven, Jr., Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and Impractical Considerations,
9 BuLL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 181,182 (1953)); see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth
Amendment in Congress: Revisiting the Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90
GEo. L.J. 2445, 2445-46 (2002) (noting that the Fifth Amendment is like "Mom, baseball, and
apple pie" but comes from "somewhat ambiguous historical roots").
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136 Id.
' See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003).
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In attempting to explain the meaning of the phrase "witness against himself,"
the Court determined that the Fifth Amendment only protects communications that are
"testimonial, incriminating, and compelled."' 38 At the outset, one obvious consider-
ation is whether the state compelled a defendant. Though compulsion may seem a
relatively straightforward proposition, the Court's jurisprudence in this area has pro-
duced a range of government behavior that may seem to compel a defendant but is
acceptable constitutionally.
39
Much of the determination of whether the state unconstitutionally compelled a
defendant hinges on the distinction between testimonial and physical information. The
Court created this distinction between testimonial or communicative evidence and
"real or physical evidence" to distinguish what is protected by the Fifth Amendment
(testimonial) from what is not protected (physical).' 4 However, this distinction is prob-
lematic in practice for courts and in theory for commentators, and it cannot provide
answers in difficult cases.' 4 ' The unsatisfying testimonial/physical doctrine contributes
to "the sense that there is a conceptual hole at the middle of the Fifth Amendment.'
' 42
This Part briefly reviews the Court's precedents with regard to compulsion and the
testimonial/physical evidence distinction.
1. Compulsion
The Fifth Amendment only protects criminal suspects from being compelled to
testify against themselves. 143 Thus, in order for the Fifth Amendment to be invoked,
the Court has held that there must be some government effort to overcome the free
will of the suspect to obtain testimony against himself.'" The test enunciated by the
Court to determine whether the state compelled a defendant is "whether, considering
the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.'
' 45
138 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 189
(2004) (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000)); see also Christopher T.
Fredrikson, What's Done is Done: Recent Developments in Self-Incrimination Law, 2005
ARMY LAw. 19, 21.
131 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,764 (1966); Allen & Mace, supra note 33,
at 251-55.
140 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 591 (1990); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
141 Amar & Lettow, supra note 132, at 857-58 (noting confusion among courts and com-
mentators on the purposes of the Fifth Amendment); Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 260.
142 Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 249.
141 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1" United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181,188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
141 Id. Without elaborating on all the philosophical details, this compulsion test can be under-
stood as relying on the concept of free will in discerning whether a suspect was compelled. See
Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 250. As such, "[i]f free will does not exist... the test is con-
ceptually and functionally bankrupt." Id. Unraveling the age-old debate of free will versus
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Incriminating statements "are admissible at trial only if the government first apprises
the defendant of the right to remain silent and that the defendant's statements can be
used against him or her, and the defendant then knowingly waives the right."'
146
Importantly, however, the Court has also held that requiring a suspect "to sub-
mit to testing ... to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and the history of the Fifth
Amendment."1 47 That said, the Fifth Amendment only applies to acts of the defen-
dant, not to the actions of the state, in analyzing information regarding physical
evidence taken from the defendant. 48 As a result, the Fifth Amendment does not
prevent the state from requiring suspects to submit to breathalyzer tests, 49 or even
from compelling suspects to provide blood samples. 50 Indeed, various court decisions
have essentially created a continuum of compulsion that ranges from acceptable to
unacceptable.' For example, courts have determined that the Fifth Amendment is
not implicated in compelling defendants "to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.' 52 However, the government
violates the Fifth Amendment when it applies too much pressure in seeking certain
kinds of information. 53 The distinction turns on the difference between testimonial
and physical self-incrimination.
2. Testimonial Versus Physical
The testimonial versus physical distinction is where the real battles in self-
incrimination jurisprudence are fought."4 For example, in Schmerber v. California,
determinism is far beyond the scope of this Note. That said, thought-reading technology cer-
tainly raises serious philosophical questions in this arena with which the medical, legal, and
philosophical worlds will have to grapple eventually. Fortunately, the various professions
implicated by the advancing field of neuroscience are already beginning to tangle with some
related questions. See, e.g., Are Your Thoughts Your Own?, supra note 7, at 407-09 (discussing
the emerging field of neuroethics); Heneghan, supra note 13 (noting the "potential for misuse"
of neuroscience technology).
146 Fifth Amendment at Trial, 32 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRoc. 567, 568-69 (2003)
(footnotes omitted).
"' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
141 Id. at 761 n.5.
"' See People v. Shaw, 531 N.E.2d 650, 651 (N.Y. 1988) (citing Schmerber generally to
support the proposition that there is no constitutional right to refuse a breathalyzer test).
"0 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
1'' Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 251-55.
152 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 & n.8.
153 Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 251-55.
154 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762-63 (noting that "[h]istory and a long line of authorities in
lower courts have consistently limited" the Fifth Amendment's protections to situations involv-
ing compelled testimonial evidence).
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the issue that divided the Court was whether a blood sample was testimonial in
nature. 5 In that case, the defendant was in an automobile accident and, while at the
hospital receiving treatment for injuries sustained in the crash, was arrested for driv-
ing under the influence. 56 On the advice of counsel, the defendant refused to give
a blood sample for use in determining whether he was drunk.' 7 Over the defendant's
objections, the arresting officer directed a doctor to take a sample of his blood; the
state later used the results at trial to convict him.
58
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the state's actions did not violate the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause because the evidence was not testi-
monial. " 9 The majority forcefully argued the use of such physical evidence in no
way implicated the Fifth Amendment,' 6° despite the fact that a state actor forced the
defendant to allow a doctor to stick him with a needle to provide the evidence that
sealed his conviction. 16' The majority explained:
In the present case, however, no such problem of application is
presented. Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or
enforced communication by the accused was involved either in
the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial
capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation,
except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which
depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood
test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion,
was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not in-
admissible on privilege grounds. 1
62
155 Id. at 765 (arguing for the majority that the blood test and its results did not involve
"even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused").
The dissent contended otherwise, arguing:
[T]he compulsory extraction of petitioner's blood for analysis so that
the person who analyzed it could give evidence to convict him had both
a "testimonial" and a "communicative nature." The sole purpose of this
project which proved to be successful was to obtain "testimony" from
some person to prove that petitioner had alcohol in his blood at the time
he was arrested. And the purpose of the project was certainly "commu-
nicative" in that the analysis of the blood was to supply information to
enable a witness to communicate to the court and jury that petitioner
was more or less drunk.
Id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
"56 Id. at 758 (majority opinion).
117 Id. at 759.
151 Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 765.
16o id.
6' Id. at 758.
162 Id. at 765.
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The four dissenting justices strenuously objected to this characterization of the
blood sample as non-testimonial. 63 Chief Justice Warren reiterated his dissent from
an earlier case involving similar facts. 64 Justice Black's dissent argued that because
the blood analysis was used for the purpose of communicating information about the
defendant that was then used against him at trial, the Court should apply the testi-
monial standard to the evidence. 65 Justices Douglas and Fortas echoed the sentiments
of the Chief Justice. 66 Justice Fortas specifically focused on the intrusive, violent
nature of the blood extraction. 67
In another alcohol-fueled case, the Court managed to muddle the murky contours
of testimonial/physical evidence distinction further. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the
Court held that a police officer compelled testimonial evidence from a suspected drunk
driver by asking him the date of his sixth birthday. 68 Once again, the key battle over
whether the state violated the Fifth Amendment was whether the officer elicited testi-
monial evidence or physical evidence. 69 The testimonial issue again splintered the
163 Id. at 772-79.
164 Id. at 772 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The case referred to by the Chief Justice was
Breithaupt v. Abram, which dealt with a blood sample drawn from an unconscious defendant.
Id.; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 432 (1957). Chief Justice Warren dissented in
Breithaupt because there was an "invasion of the body" that he believed should be determi-
native in the absence of consent. Id. at 441 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). He stressed that whether
a defendant was conscious and objected to the taking of the blood sample was irrelevant given
the invasive nature of the governmental action. Id.
165 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting). Beyond his complaints that the
majority erred in holding that the blood sample was physical, not testimonial, evidence, Justice
Black lamented the use of the words testimonial and communicative to restrict the scope of
the Fifth Amendment:
These words are not models of clarity and precision as the Court's rather
labored explication shows. Nor can the Court, so far as I know, find pre-
cedent in the former opinions of this Court for using these particular
words to limit the scope of the Fifth Amendment's protection. There is
a scholarly precedent, however, in the late Professor Wigmore's learned
treatise on evidence. . . . Though my admiration for Professor
Wigmore's scholarship is great, I regret to see the word he used to
narrow the Fifth Amendment's protection play such a major part in any
of this Court's opinions.
Id. (citations omitted).
'" Id. at 778-79 (Douglas, J., & Fortas, J., in separate dissenting opinions).
167 Id. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("As prosecutor, the State has no right to commit any
kind of violence upon the person, or to utilize the results of such a tort, and the extraction of
blood, over protest, is an act of violence.").
168 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 585-86 (1990).
169 Id. at 592-93 (citing the argument in the state's brief that the inference created by the
officer's question was permissible because it was based on "the physiological functioning of
[Muniz's] brain"); see also, Brief of Petitioner at 15-16, Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (No. 89-213).
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Court, with five justices agreeing that the birthday question was testimonial and four
dissenting on that point. 1
70
Justice Brennan, who also wrote the majority opinion in Schmerber holding that
the blood test was permissible physical evidence,' rejected the state's assertion in
Muniz that the response to the officer's birthday question was simply physical evidence
just like the "physiological makeup of his blood and the timbre of his voice."' 172 Justice
Brennan asserted that the state misconstrued the proper question in the case. 173 Accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, the proper question was "whether the incriminating inference
of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act or from physical evidence."' 74
Because the inference in Muniz arose from an act the Court deemed testimonial-
i.e., answering a police officer's question incorrectly-the police violated Muniz's
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege.175 Presumably, had the officer forcibly
drawn a blood sample from Muniz, the sample would have been admissible even
though his response to a simple question was deemed testimonial.
176
To reach this somewhat counter-intuitive result, the Court relied on the history and
policies underlying the Fifth Amendment. 177 The Court noted that the Fifth Amend-
ment was designed to guard against historical abuses, such as those perpetrated in
the ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber.'7 ' Based on this historical reading, the
Court decided that the primary protection offered by the Fifth Amendment was to
prevent instances where suspects "must face the modem-day analog of the historic
trilemma" of "truth, falsity, or silence.' '179 As such, verbal statements tend to be testi-
monial because they tend to convey information.180 Drawing blood, however, does not
require an act on the defendant's part.' 8' While a blood sample may communicate
information, it does not subject the defendant to the trilemma and falls outside of the
Court's Fifth Amendment concerns.8 2
170 Muniz, 496 U.S. 582.
'' Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757.
172 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 593.
173 Id.
174 id.
175 Id. at 600.
176 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
177 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594-97.
178 Id. at 595-96 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988)).
179 Id. at 596-97.
180 Id. at 597.
181 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
182 Id. Ironically, perhaps, the Court's conclusion based on its reading of history leads to the
likelihood that the state could now obtain incriminating evidence by violent means (such as
strapping a patient down and taking a blood sample) but not by simple questioning. Given the
Court's concern for the "stark brutality" of the Star Chamber and other historic abuses that gave
rise to the Fifth Amendment, the end result of its reasoning demonstrates the difficulties that
the Court has in explaining the scope of Fifth Amendment protections. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 596
(quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956)).
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Im. DOES THOUGHT-READING TECHNOLOGY "SEARCH" A DEFENDANT FOR
COMPELLED TESTIMONY?
As a baseline matter, the first test that thought-reading technology must pass
would be the reliability standard set forth by Daubert.'3 Thought-reading technology
must first be fully developed before it could be deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy
Daubert. 84 However, given the pace of research in this area, it is safe to assume that
the technology will likely, at some point, be able to pass the Daubert barrier. 85 Assum-
ing science eventually develops technology that is sufficiently reliable to monitor
the functions of a suspect's brain and read her thoughts, what then?
There would be pressure to use this technology in not only solving, but preventing
crimes. For example, if thought-reading technology is sufficiently refined, why not
deploy it as an additional layer of security at airports to detect people with terrorist-
like thoughts or inclinations?' 86 The possibilities for this technology are boundless.
Telling police they will be handicapped by not allowing them to take advantage of this
miraculous new technology may not be popular. Just because something is popular,
of course, does not mean it is constitutional or should be implemented. To that end,
would police use of thought-reading technology be permissible under the Supreme
Court's current Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, or would those doctrines
need to be stretched to allow law enforcement to use this technology?
A. Searching the Mind?
The first question thought-reading technology would pose is whether it is a search
under the Fourth Amendment. 87 If so, a court would have to determine whether such
a search is reasonable.188 As discussed earlier, following Katz and Kyllo, the question
of whether thought-reading constituted a search requires a determination of whether
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his thoughts and the closely
related idea of whether the technology in question is in general public use.' 89 Despite
Katz's "people, not places" language, 1 ° the location of a thought-reading scan could
183 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590-93 & n.9 (1993).
184 See id. (defining "evidentiary reliability" as based upon scientific validity).
185 See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
186 For an analogous hypothetical using slightly different technology, see Dery, supra note
46, examining the constitutional implications of thermal imaging lie detection technology.
187 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides a good starting place be-
cause, to some degree, the protections against unreasonable searches in the Fourth Amendment
can be viewed as encompassing the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
For a thorough explanation of this argument, see Pardo, supra note 46, at 1879-81.
188 Pardo, supra note 46, at 1867.
189 See supra Part II.A (discussing the tests for determining when a search occurs).
190 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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also play a role. Indeed, there could be a number of factors wrapped up in determining
whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his thoughts.
For starters, Justice Scalia's "general public use" language from Kyllo would have
a clear bearing on the reasonable expectations of privacy. 9' If only government and
medical facilities have access to thought-reading devices and software, then a defen-
dant would likely have a reasonable expectation that her thoughts would be private.
But thought-reading technology could ultimately become ubiquitous. Businesses
could use it to anticipate customers' needs. Friends could use it as part of a video
game system, immersing themselves more fully in the gaming experience by con-
trolling the screen simply by thinking of moves. '92 Car manufacturers could develop
user interfaces that allow people to interact with their vehicle simply by thinking.
If thought-reading technology becomes widely adopted as consumer technology,
as voice-based lie detectors have apparently become,'93 societal conceptions of private
thoughts could be vastly different than they are today. If everyone could figure out
what everyone else is thinking, would the concept of private thoughts even continue
to exist? In a world where thought-reading technology could pervade a home, allow-
ing mental direction to turn on and off lights, adjust the heat, dial a neighbor, or change
the channel, why would people not expect law enforcement to use some form of
thought-reading to catch criminals or even potentially prevent crime? 94 That would
only seem reasonable.
Alternatively, consider a society where thoughts are routinely recorded, bought,
and sold in open markets (white and black).195 What constitutes a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in such a world is unclear. Arguably, such recordings would be no
different from a video recording made on a camcorder. To a certain degree we can
expect that such recordings will stay somewhat private if we only use them in the
privacy of our own home. The advent of the Internet and digital video altered this
expectation."' Now when such digital recordings are uploaded to the Internet, that
191 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
192 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 5 (detailing an experiment in which an epileptic child con-
trolled a video game with his mind); Lombardi, supra note 14 (discussing plans to release a
helmet that reads people's minds to control video games).
193 See supra note 119 (discussing the ready availability of voice-based lie detection
software over the Internet).
194 This is especially true if people's intentions can indeed be gleaned from an fMRI scan.
See Scan "Can Read, " supra note 14. The idea of using thought-reading to prevent crimes
before they happen is similar to the concept of "Precrime" embodied in the Stephen Spielberg
movie Minority Report (which was loosely based on a Philip K. Dick short story) though in that
case the "technology" was not thought-reading but clairvoyance. MINORITY REPORT, supra
note 2.
'9' See STRANGE DAYS, supra note 2.
196 See David V. Richards, Note, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case
for Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85
TEx. L. REv. 1321 (2007) (discussing the amount of personal information that may be
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reasonable expectation of privacy vanishes altogether-all of those recordings be-
come fodder for comedians, voyeurs, and the unscrupulous. 9 7 Perhaps a line could
be drawn such that non-law-breaking thought recordings are reasonably expected to
be private while such an expectation would not attach to thought recordings involv-
ing criminal activity.' 98 That way, ordinary law-abiding citizens could not have their
thought recordings (or thoughts) searched by police without reasonable suspicion.
If airport police scan the brain of someone who is planning to blow up a plane, the
would-be terrorist could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such thoughts,
and there would have been no search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Or maybe a better way to conceive of reasonable expectations in light of pervasive
thought-reading technology would be a return to the location based reasoning that
dominated before Katz. 99 Thoughts read in public places (airports, malls, casinos,
offices, etc.) would not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy because thought-
reading technology would be presumed to be in use.200 Thoughts read in homes or
offices would carry a reasonable expectation of privacy and receive some of the Fourth
Amendment's protections.20' Perhaps thoughts on car rides or long walks on the beach
would carry a middle ground expectation of privacy, depending on the context.
202
posted on the web and the lack of substantial law enforcement or legal protection of things
that are posted).
' Facebook, MySpace, and YouTube, for example, clearly impact our current
conceptions of home videos as private. See Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited
Feb. 14, 2008) (describing the site's service as "a social utility that connects you with the
people around you"); MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2008) (billing
itself as "a place for friends"); YouTube, http://youtube.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2008)
(declaring "Broadcast Yourself'). Because of these websites, no video can really be
considered a "private" video anymore.
198 There is at least some support for a line to be drawn based on the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (noting that a
"reasonable person" for purposes of determining whether an encounter with police is con-
sensual "presupposes an innocent person"). Further, one could argue that thoughts involving
a crime never carry the same kind of reasonable expectation of privacy as thoughts about one's
private life. The thoughts are about a violation of the rules of society. As such, it could be
said that the defendant should not expect to be able to keep such'thoughts hidden in the face
of thought-reading technology. Society has a right to protect itself from harm that a future
defendant is planning, and society should not have to give the same kind of protection to such
illicit thoughts as it would afford non-criminal thoughts.
199 See Simmons, supra note 59, at 1303; Steinberg, supra note 58, at 1053.
20 This situation is analogous to the current reduced expectation of privacy in airports. See
Brett Andrew Skean, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the New Face of Terrorism:
How September 11th Could Change the Way America Flies, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 567,
585-87 (2002) (noting that as concerns of terrorism increase, certain invasive searches become
expected and standard practice in airports).
201 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("[A] search of the house or office is
generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on probable cause.").
202 Determining whether a search is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes would also
turn on many of the same issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs. See supra Parts II.A,
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B. Compelling Testimony?
As an initial matter, for thought-reading to implicate the Fifth Amendment, there
must be some type of compulsion involved. 20 3 The government must do something
to overcome a defendant's Will.2°4 In a sense, thought-reading technology does not
overcome a defendant's will. Rather, it simply reads, among other things, what her will
is. The defendant does not have to make a choice to reveal anything-the technology
simply scans the brain and reveals all of it.205 Thought-reading technology may not
require defendants to say anything or respond to any stimuli. In such a case, where is
the compulsion? If it cannot be found, the Fifth Amendment is useless as protection
from thought-reading technology.
Recall that the key battleground in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination arena
focuses on whether the information sought is testimonial or physical in nature.2 °6
Forced extraction of someone's blood is not protected by the Fifth Amendment be-
cause it does not involve communication of testimonial information.0 7 Answering
questions designed to elicit incriminating answers can be protected.20 8 Would thought-
reading technology be simply another form of physical evidence akin to drawing
blood? Or should it be deemed testimonial given that the state would draw incrimi-
nating inferences from physical information that is really geared to elicit testimony?
There are strong arguments on both sides of this equation. FMRI and other
potential thought-reading technologies work in the same fundamental way as blood
tests-both analyze physical characteristics exhibited by a person for the purpose of
gaining information that could be potentially incriminating.2 °9 Consider, for example,
a hit-and-run case where the police track down the person driving the car. If the police
found the person quickly, they could take a blood sample (or administer a breath-
alyzer test) and determine whether the driver was drunk. Alternatively, the police theo-
retically could simply subject the driver to a quick, painless brain scan to determine
II.B.4. Although there would be an added layer of protection from the requirement that a war-
rant accompany a search or an exception for a warrantless search, the question still devolves
into one of whether reading thoughts is reasonable. If thought-reading technology changes our
conceptions of what is and is not reasonable, this really provides no additional protections
at all.
203 See supra Part II.C. 1.
204 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
205 See Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 248-50 (discussing a parallel hypothetical using a
lie detector); Pardo, supra note 46, at 1863 (noting that under a "cruel-trilemma theory" some-
one subjected to an enhanced lie detector that scans brain responses does not have a choice).
206 See supra Part II.C.2.
207 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
208 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 585-87 (1990).
209 Cf Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 260-61 (noting that the testimonial/physical dis-
tinction cannot capture the differences between the data pulled from a blood sample and from
a forced lie detector test).
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whether the memories of the accident were impaired by alcohol or other substances.
Either way, the tests are designed to get at the same basic information through physical
analysis of the driver. No communication need take place-the driver would not
necessarily open his mouth and speak in response to any government actions, thus
triggering Fifth Amendment protections. 2'0 Thought-reading technology need not
even subject a defendant to the "cruel trilemma" of "truth, falsity, or silence. '21
On the other hand, it could be argued that the Court's current Fifth Amendment
analysis would offer protections from thought-reading devices. After all, in Schmerber,
Justice Brennan specifically noted that lie detectors may be an example of physical
evidence that is, in reality, testimonial.21 2 The Court distinguished lie detectors, which
measure physiological reactions to questioning, from other forms of physical evi-
dence.21 3 Justice Brennan noted that, ultimately, the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment are "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard. '2 4 "To
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to
evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. ' 215 Clearly, for Justice Brennan,
thought-reading technology would violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. But this result does not necessarily follow based on the
Court's testimonial/physical test and precedents.1 6
210 See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 593 (noting that an "incriminating inference" must come from
a testimonial act to trigger Fifth Amendment protections).
211 Id. at 595-97 (discussing the trilemma); see also Pardo, supra note 46, at 1863-64
(discussing the possibility that the government could use a thought-reading lie detector on
a suspect without violating the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause using a reli-
ability analysis because the defendant would not face any choice with regard to revealing any
information).
212 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 ("Some tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence,'
for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial.").
213 Id.
214 Id. (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
215 Id.; see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Physical acts will constitute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception,
or cognition of the witness. The Court should not retreat from the plain implications of this rule
and hold that such testimony may be compelled, even when self-incriminating, simply because
it is not spoken."); Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 266-67 (citing Doe v. United States, 487
U.S. 201, 211 (1988)) ("It is the 'extortion of information from the accused,' the attempt to
force him 'to disclose the contents of his own mind,' that implicates the Self-Incrimination
Clause." (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Curcio v. United States,
354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957) (internal citations omitted))).
216 See Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 261 (noting that the testimonial test cannot "explain
the reoccurring specter of the polygraph"). At least one commentator agrees with Justice
Brennan in the lie detector setting. See Dery, supra note 46, at 247 (noting that evidence that
could be obtained by using a thermal imaging lie detector while asking someone if they
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Justice Brennan's formulation of the testimonial/physical test in Muniz is instruc-
tive. There, he stated that the test is "whether the incriminating inference... is drawn
from a testimonial act or from physical evidence. 217 Lie detector tests require an
examiner to ask questions and then gauge physiological responses in concert with
the answer to determine the veracity of the subject's statement.21 The answer consti-
tutes a testimonial act, and the physical evidence is really being gathered to determine
that act's truth.219 If there is no testimonial act involved, this distinction is of no help.
With thought-reading technology, there would not necessarily be any testimonial
act required. A mature form of brain fingerprinting need not elicit responses from
stimuli to determine the presence of latent knowledge. The defendant would not ever
engage in any testimonial act-looking at physical evidence could determine everything
the police would need to know. For example, expanding current routine procedure,
police could scan the thoughts of suspects for information that only the criminal would
know. In essence, the scan would function precisely the way a forced blood sample
does. Both would be situations where police take physical evidence and examine
it to determine whether it demonstrates guilt or innocence. Although thought-reading
technology may violate the "spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment,' 220 the Court's
testimonial/physical evidence distinction does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that thought-reading technology would actually violate the Fifth Amendment.
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH THOUGHT-READING TECHNOLOGY
UNDER THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
Neither the Court's current Fourth or Fifth Amendment doctrines lead neces-
sarily to the conclusion that thought-reading technology would be verboten under the
Constitution. To the contrary, when pushed, current doctrines leave open the very real
possibility that the wrong facts and societal conditions could open the door to law
enforcement use of such technology. Just because current Supreme Court doctrine
may not prohibit law enforcement use of thought-reading technology should not
dictate permissible use of thought-reading technology by law enforcement. This is
precisely the result the Court should avoid. The Constitution generally and the Bill
of Rights specifically were designed in large part to protect individuals from govern-
mental tyranny. 221 Any regime that permits the use of technology to read people's
thoughts and determine guilt or innocence based on reading minds necessarily creates
intended to commit a terrorist act on a plane is "precisely the kind that is covered by the Fifth
Amendment as 'testimonial' or 'communicative"').
217 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 593 (1990).
218 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
219 Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33
AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 333 (2006).
220 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
221 See Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 366-67 (1917) (Day, J., dissenting).
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an environment that is ripe for the kind of government oppression that the Constitution
should prevent.
The preceding Part took a mechanical approach to analyzing thought-reading
technology under the Court's current Fourth and Fifth Amendment tests and pur-
posely stretched the tests to the extreme.222 Undoubtedly, as the Court grapples with
the ramifications of applying its precedent to thought-reading technology, it would
use a more flexible approach designed to curb some of the worst potential abuses.
The preceding Parts were designed to emphasize the serious potential problems with
the Court's current approaches. That a mechanical analysis of current Court rules
could permit any use of thought-reading technology is unsettling. This, coupled with
the murky, confused state of affairs in Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrines begs for
a new approach to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, taking into account rapidly
advancing, potentially invasive technology.
A. Toward a New Set of Standards
The Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendmentjurisprudence discussed in this Note can
be viewed as a set of responses to changing technology. Both standards attempt to
balance some of the fundamental principles underlying the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments with technological advances and the needs of law enforcement. 223 However,
the technology the Court has dealt with to date, while transformational, was not as
revolutionary as thought-reading technology. Thought-reading technology presents
challenges unlike any other technology in history. Not surprisingly, the Court's
current tests are simply inadequate to deal with the challenges presented by thought-
reading technology in a satisfying way.
B. Cognition and Its Limitations
At least one set of commentators has tried to develop a coherent framework for
analyzing the Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence that could be adapted to deal
with thought-reading technology generally. Allen and Mace argue that based on the
Court's Fifth Amendment self-incrimination cases, the true rule for determining Self-
Incrimination Clause violations is "that the government may not compel revelation
of the incriminating substantive results of compelled cognition." '224 This seductively
222 See discussion supra Part III.
223 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (discussing the ability of tech-
nology to shrink privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment and purporting to draw the
line of the limits of such technological effects). In the Fifth Amendment context, Schmerber,
for example, dealt with a blood test that did not exist at the time of the country's founding. 384
U.S. 757. The Court's decision in Schmerber can be viewed, in part, as an attempt to fit this
new technology into the Fifth Amendment framework. See id.
224 Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 268. Admittedly, Allen and Mace's project was merely
to develop a coherent theory that could explain the Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence.
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simple synthesis of the Court's Fifth Amendment rulings seems well-suited to deal
with thought-reading technology.
However, because the cognition standard is based on current Court precedent, its
inadequacies are readily apparent. The term cognition in itself is potentially broad
enough to protect Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Viewing cognition as "the
acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of knowledge,"' 25 theoretically would prevent
government use of any thought-reading technology. Reading cognition would neces-
sarily require some form of compulsion--compulsion that could implicitly be deemed
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes absent other factors.226 Therefore,
thought-reading scans would be searches that would, at least, require a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement. Even if the
government had a warrant or an exception, the Fifth Amendment would bar use of
incriminating information obtained through a scan of cognition.
But cognition can also be narrowly defined, as Allen and Mace's analysis shows.
Allen and Mace subtly modify what counts as cognition to reflect Court doctrine,
thereby reducing its attractiveness as part of a standard. 227 They "use [cognition] to
refer to the intellectual processes that allow one to gain and make use of substantive
knowledge and to compare one's 'inner world' (previous knowledge) with the 'outside
world' (including stimuli, such as questions from an interrogator). 228 Further, specifi-
cally excluded from this conception of cognition are things like "simple psychological
responses to stimuli such as fear, warmness, and hunger.., and one's will or faculty
for choice. '229 Thus, cognition would seemingly not protect against attempts to read
latent knowledge (such as an advanced form of brain fingerprinting that does not
rely on presenting subjects with stimuli of any kind) or even advanced fMRI-based
lie detection (because such detection would arguably monitor choices being made
between telling the truth or lying).230
See id. at 248. As such, the Court is to blame for any failures of cognition theory to sufficiently
protect Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The authors do an exceptional job synthesizing
the Court's somewhat disjointed Fifth Amendment decisions. See id. at 277-89.
225 Id. at 267.
226 See supra Part II.C. 1.
227 Allen & Mace, supra note 33, at 266-67 & n.107.
228 Id. at 267.
229 Id.
230 Allen and Mace argue, however, that the cognition standard protects "those propositions
with truth-value that tend to incriminate the author." Id. at 268. Of course, Allen and Mace were
dealing with the Court's current rules, not proposing a standard to deal with new technology.
See id. at 248. As such, their argument misses some key points. First, if brain fingerprinting
technology matures, scans could measure latent knowledge, something that would not in-
volve any intellectual processes but that would simply measure physical features to determine
whether someone possesses knowledge. Further, thought-reading technology need not neces-
sarily look to "propositions with truth-value." Thought-reading could potentially look only at
the processes going on in one's mind when answering a question to determine truth or falsity-
i.e., the technology could simply determine when a person has chosen to use free will and lie.
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Beyond an overly restrictive view of cognition, Allen and Mace's standard focuses
on the idea of "compelled cognition., 23' Thus, it prevents only measurements of cog-
nition in response to something done by the government. 232 Thus, the government
could potentially scan thoughts for incriminating evidence as long as the government
did not do anything to evoke those thoughts, such as posing a question.233 As a result,
assuming that thought-reading could be deemed reasonable for Fourth Amendment
purposes, any incriminating thoughts obtained by a government brain scan executed
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause would be permissible, as long as
the government did not compel thoughts. Such a result indicates that a cognition stan-
dard fails to offer any real safeguards.
C. Searching for Freedom of Thought with No Incrimination
In developing a standard beyond cognition to address the challenges posed by
thought-reading technology to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the First Amendment
and its implicit guarantees make a good starting point.3 The First Amendment states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances., 235 Freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly-all these rights are tied to a more fundamental right that is not
explicitly included in the Constitution anywhere-freedom of thought. Freedom of
thought is the necessary prerequisite to the exercise of all of the freedoms guaranteed
to the people of the United States in the First Amendment.2 36 As the Supreme Court
231 Id. at 268.
232 Id. ("It is important to note that state action is required to trigger both the cognition and
the disclosure of the results. There would be nothing unconstitutional about the police compel-
ling a suspect to think about whether he was guilty if the thoughts were never elicited or were
disclosed voluntarily.").
233 id.
234 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment could ultimately be one of the strongest
protections against the misuse of thought-reading technology. A full discussion of the First
Amendment implications of thought-reading technology is beyond the scope of this Note.
235 Id.
236 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Founders "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations"). The common law at the time the Founders wrote the Constitution
recognized the right to keep one's thoughts private, so the link between freedom of speech
and freedom of thought is arguably embedded in the Founders' understanding of the First
Amendment. Cf Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 195, 198 (1890) (noting that advancements in human achievement necessitated
development of legal recognition and protection of "[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations" and
discussing the common law right to determine what thoughts to communicate or withhold).
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noted, what the First Amendment fundamentally protects is the right of a citizen to
"decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, con-
sideration, and adherence.
2 37
Viewing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in light of the First Amendment's
implicit protection of thoughts is instructive. Whatever standard the Court ultimately
adopts to deal with thought-reading technology should be predicated on the necessity
of freedom of thought. Any standard that allows the government to engage in any
technologically enhanced activity that impinges, even slightly, on the right to free
thought should not be allowed. Reasonable Fourth Amendment searches should not
include searches of one's thoughts. Fifth Amendment self-incriminating testimony
should include any thoughts, intentions, or physical manifestation of thoughts and
intentions, read by a machine, regardless of the particular form of technology.
2 38
These guiding principles are simply stated, straightforward, and easily translated
into a broader theory that should be used as guidance in other constitutional areas.
That broader theory is that the Constitution guarantees freedom from governmental
use of technologies that purport to measure physical expressions of thought, regardless
of how that technology functions. This broad statement necessarily flows from the
freedom of thought implicit in the First Amendment, but also derives directly from
principles underlying the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment
secures the people's rights in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures" by restricting the ability of the government to intrude
on these areas. 39 It is a limitation on governmental power and a defense of individual
liberties because it forces the government to act reasonably in its prosecution of
citizens. 40 Given the fundamental right to freedom of thought that underlies the
Although the Constitution does not expressly make this link, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights does. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Articles 18-20 deal with
the same basic rights outlined by the First Amendment but include freedom of thought as the
first of these necessary rights. Id. at arts. 18-20.
237 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
238 Of course, the Fifth Amendment only protects against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Presumably, non-incriminating thoughts read by the government would not be
covered by the Fifth Amendment. But where should such a line be drawn? Allowing some
thoughts to be used against a defendant because they are insufficiently incriminating opens the
door for courts to review any and all thoughts read by the government. Making calls as to what
is a protected, incriminating thought and what is an unprotected thought would be a messy
business that is best avoided by adopting a truly bright-line rule.
239 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
240 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that unjustified
governmental intrusions on the privacy of the individual violate the Fourth Amendment);
see also Joginder S. Dhillon & Robert I. Smith, Defensive Information Operations and
Domestic Law: Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques, 50 A.F. L. REV. 135,
145 (2001) (noting that the Fourth Amendment limits the government's ability to intrude
[Vol. 16:865898
1984 ARRIVES
Constitution, searches of thoughts should simply never be reasonable. The Fifth
Amendment also restricts potential excesses of the government in prosecuting citi-
zens.24 ' Although the Framers did not imagine that one day governments could have
technology that would allow them to read citizens' thoughts, they knew that govern-
ments had committed reprehensible acts in extracting self-incriminating information
from citizens, and they sought to prevent such practices from occurring here.242 Com-
pelling the disclosure of thoughts (incriminating or otherwise) through the use of brain
scanning technology evokes the spirit of such historical excesses and should be
impermissible.
The broad standard proposed here cannot completely supplant the Court's Fourth
and Fifth Amendment standards as they currently stand. It is designed as a preemptive
response to technology that, simply put, will fundamentally change our society.243 The
Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is messy at best, and scholars
endeavor to offer suggestions for improvement.244 As scholars and courts continue
to grapple with the complexities presented by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, they
need to begin to take account of rapidly evolving, transformational technologies.
Thought-reading technology may not be a reality today, but it will be soon. As Justice
Brandeis noted in his dissent in Olmstead, "in the application of a constitution, [the
Court's] contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. 245
Thought-reading technology "may be" surprisingly close to becoming reality. The
legal community needs to be prepared to grapple with the mass of thorny issues this
technology brings with it.
on the people's lives).
241 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-96 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United States,
487 U.S. 201, 212 (1998)).
242 id.
243 As such, note that this proposed standard does not ban the use of sense-enhancing
technology generally. Sense-enhancing technologies can potentially serve law enforcement
in beneficial ways. Further, this proposed standard would not affect the ability of law enforce-
ment to use now-routine tools such as blood tests, DNA tests, or breathalyzers, for example.
See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text; see also Erin Murphy, The New Forensics:
Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL.
L. REv. 721 (2007) (discussing the pervasiveness as well as the pitfalls of "secondary-
generation" scientific evidence such as DNA testing). Only technology that is designed to
probe the thoughts, feelings or minds of suspects or witnesses should be verboten. For an in
depth discussion of the application of the Fourth Amendment to sense-enhanced searches, see
David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment,
16 WM. & MARY BuL RTS. J. 465 (2007).
244 See supra Part IV.B.
245 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
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D. Beyond Governmental Uses-Final Considerations
The legal and constitutional implications of thought-reading technology are not
going to be exhausted any time soon. As a final thought, scholars should begin to
address some of the following issues. First, what should be done about the inverse
of the problems presented in this Note-namely, how should defendants be able to use
thought-reading technology? To date, the Court has held that per se rules against
the use of lie detectors do not violate defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to present
a defense. 24 6 Should this holding remain intact in the context of thought-reading
technology? Next, how should the legal field respond to attempts to use thought-
reading technology in civil cases where the government is not directly involved in use
of the technology? On a related note, what happens if the technology of the movie
Strange Days becomes a reality? Should it make a difference under the Constitution
whether a defendant recorded his thoughts and feelings as he committed a robbery?
Finally, how should policy makers begin to deal with thought-reading technology?
Should neuromarketing be allowed to develop in response to an apparent market
demand or should the practice be banned? Amazingly, all of these questions and more
are no longer merely hypotheticals-they are the reality of our future.
Orwell may have missed the mark by a few decades, but the technology that he
feared would lead to unbreakable totalitarian society is now visible on the horizon.
To prevent abuses of this technology and totalitarian dystopias, the legal community
and society at large need to begin dealing with the implications of thought-reading
technology before it becomes reality.
246 See generally United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that a defendant's
right to present exculpatory evidence may be restricted by evidentiary rules that exclude
evidence considered unreliable by experts).
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